Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes : a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fan, Cuihong ; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn ; Wolfstetter, Elmar |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-1270, ZDB-ID 1459207-1. - Vol. 52.2023, 3, p. 775-804
|
Subject: | Bertrand-Stackelberg games | Espionage | Incomplete information | Price leadership | Signaling | Tacit collusion | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy | Duopol | Duopoly | Unvollkommene Information | Signalling | Preisführer | Oligopol | Oligopoly |
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