Price of anarchy and price of stability in multi-agent project scheduling
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Agnetis, Alessandro ; Briand, Cyril ; Ngueveu, Sandra Ulrich ; S̆ůcha, Pr̆emysl |
Published in: |
Project management and scheduling. - New York, NY, USA : Springer. - 2020, p. 97-119
|
Subject: | Multi-agent project scheduling | Nash equilibria | Flow networks | Price of anarchy | Price of stability | Theorie | Theory | Scheduling-Verfahren | Scheduling problem | Projektmanagement | Project management | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Agentenbasierte Modellierung | Agent-based modeling | Preisstabilität | Price stability | Engpass | Bottleneck |
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