Pricing Algorithms as Collusive Devices

This paper undertakes a critical review of the prospect that self-learning pricing algorithms will lead to widespread collusion independently of the intervention and participation of humans. There is no concrete evidence, no example yet, and no antitrust case that self-learning pricing algorithms have colluded let alone increased the prospect of collusion across the economy

MoreLess

Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Veljanovski, Cento G.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Preismanagement \| Pricing strategy \| Wettbewerbsbeschränkung \| Restraints of competition \| Algorithmus \| Algorithm \| Preiswettbewerb \| Price competition \| Preiskartell \| Price-fixing cartel \| Duopol \| Duopoly

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (19 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 6, 2020 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3644360 [DOI]
Classification:	D42 - Monopoly ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D50 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium. General ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; K21 - Antitrust Law ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure; Industrial Price Indices
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013212718