Principal-agent settings with random shocks
Jared Rubin (Argyros School of Business and Economics and Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, California), Roman Sheremeta (Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio; and Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, California)
| Year of publication: |
April 2016
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Rubin, Jared ; Sheremeta, Roman M. |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 62.2016, 4, p. 985-999
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| Subject: | gift exchange | principal-agent model | contract theory | reciprocity | effort | shocks | laboratory experiment | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Experiment | Schock | Shock | Austauschtheorie | Social exchange theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2177 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011460525