Private Information, Transferable Utility, and the Core

Considered here are transferable-utility, coalitional production or market games, featuring differently informed players. It is assumed that personalized contracts must comply with idiosyncratic information. The setting may create two sorts of shadow prices: one for material endowments, the other for knowledge. Focus is on specific, computable solutions that are generated by such prices and belong to the private core. Solutions of that sort obtain under standard regularity assumptions.

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Year of publication:	2007-02-07
Authors:	Flåm, Sjur Didrik ; Koutsougeras, L.
Institutions:	Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen
Subject:	exchange economy \| cooperative game \| transferable utility \| differential information \| private core \| Lagrangian duality \| value of information

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Working Papers in Economics Number 04/07 26 pages
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; D51 - Exchange and Production Economies ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008876392