Private strategies in finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring
Year of publication: |
2002 ; [Elektronische Ressource]
|
---|---|
Other Persons: | Mailath, George J. (contributor) ; Matthews, Steven A. (contributor) ; Sekiguchi, Tadashi (contributor) |
Published in: |
Contributions to theoretical economics. - Berkeley, Calif. : Bepress, ISSN 1534-5971, ZDB-ID 2040052-4. - Vol. 2.2002, 1
|
Subject: | Vollkommene Information | Complete information | Theorie | Theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
Type of publication: | Article |
---|---|
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Contributions to theoretical economics Systemvoraussetzung: Acrobat reader |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
Karmann, Alexander, (2001)
-
Private strategies in finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring
Mailath, George J., (2001)
-
Repeated games with complete information
Sorin, Sylvain, (1988)
- More ...
-
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J., (2002)
-
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J., (2001)
-
Private strategies in finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring
Mailath, George J., (2001)
- More ...