Private versus complete information in auctions

We show that, in several (but not all) standard auctions, (i) private independent values and (ii) complete information are payoff equivalent. The first-price auction generates the same revenue under (i) and (ii); the all-pay auction has lower revenue under (ii).

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Morath, Florian ; Münster, Johannes
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 101.2008, 3, p. 214-216
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Auctions All-pay auctions War of attrition Revenue equivalence Information

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005270332