Privately versus Publicly Optimal Skin in the Game: Optimal Mechanism and Security Design
Year of publication: |
2011-05
|
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Authors: | Chemla, Gilles ; Hennessy, Christopher |
Institutions: | C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers |
Subject: | adverse selection | originate to distribute | screening incentives | securitization | skin in the game | speculator | uninformed investors |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 8403 |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure ; G38 - Government Policy and Regulation ; L51 - Economics of Regulation |
Source: |
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