Privatization with Political Constraints: Auctions versus Private Negotiations

This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market economies characterized by political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization mechanisms. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of privatization mechanisms observed in practice and the frequent use of an apparently suboptimal privatization mechanism: private negotiations.

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Year of publication:	1999-01-01
Authors:	Fluck, Zsuzsanna ; John, Kose ; Ravid, S. Abraham
Institutions:	Finance Department, Stern School of Business

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005663447