Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences

We consider the problem of assigning indivisible goods among a group of agents with lotteries when the preference profile is single-peaked. Unfortunately, even on this restricted domain of preferences, equal treatment of equals, stochastic dominance efficiency, and stochastic dominance strategy-proofness are incompatible. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Kasajima, Yoichi
Published in:	Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 41.2013, 1, p. 203-215
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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