Project staff scheduling with theory of coalition
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Arık, Oğuzhan Ahmet ; Köse, Erkan ; Forrest, Jeffrey Yi-Lin |
Published in: |
Group decision and negotiation. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0926-2644, ZDB-ID 1155213-X. - Vol. 28.2019, 4, p. 827-847
|
Subject: | Shapley value | Coalition formation | Project scheduling | Staff allocation | Koalition | Coalition | Scheduling-Verfahren | Scheduling problem | Projektmanagement | Project management | Shapley-Wert | Personaleinsatzplanung | Crew scheduling | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
-
Sharing delay costs in stochastic scheduling problems with delays
Gonçalves-Dosantos, J. C., (2020)
-
Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation
Ke, Changxia, (2021)
-
Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation
Ke, Changxia, (2021)
- More ...
-
Forrest, Jeffrey Yi-Lin, (2021)
-
Forrest, Jeffrey Yi-Lin, (2021)
-
Memetic algorithm for unrelated parallel machine scheduling problem with grey processing times
Arık, Oğuzhan Ahmet, (2023)
- More ...