Property Rights, Incomplete Contracts, and Social Harm.

The authors construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative externality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. The authors analyze several kinds of rights, including damages, injunctions, and rights to exclude (arising from covenants or land ownership).

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Pitchford, R. ; Snyder, C.M.
Institutions:	Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, College of Asia and the Pacific
Subject:	PROPERTY RIGHTS \| EXTERNALITIES \| GAME THEORY

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Series:	Australian National University - Department of Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	39 pages
Classification:	K11 - Property Law ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005663672