Proportional Representation with Uncertainty

We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented.

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Year of publication:	2014-12
Authors:	Sinopoli, Francesco De ; Iannantuoni, Giovanna ; Manzoni, Elena ; Pimienta, Carlos
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Economia, Metodi Quantitativi e Strategie d'Impresa (DEMS), Facoltà di Economia
Subject:	Proportional Election \| Strategic Voting \| Legislative Bargaining

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 288 1 pages long
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103552