Protecting minorities through the average voting rules
Year of publication: |
2003-04
|
---|---|
Authors: | Renault, Régis ; Trannoy, Alain |
Institutions: | Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), Aix-Marseille School of Economics (AMSE) |
Subject: | minority | majority voting | public goods | Nash equilibrium |
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