Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure

We analyze a model of lobbying by oligopolists who allocate entrepreneurial time between lobbying and internal control (monitoring). We seek answers to the following questions: (i) if firms differ woth recpect to comparative advantage in lobbying, what is the equilibrium allocation of time between lobbying and monitoring? (ii) can the possibility of lobbying reverse the profitablity ranking among heterogenous firms?

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Long, N.V. ; Soubeyran, A. ; Hillman, A.
Institutions:	Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), Aix-Marseille School of Economics (AMSE)
Subject:	OLIGOPOLIES \| INDUSTRY

More details

Series:	G.R.E.Q.A.M..
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	22 pages
Classification:	F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634327