Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts
Pierre Chaigneau, Nicolas Sahuguet, Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
| Year of publication: |
August 2017
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre ; Sahuguet, Nicolas ; Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard |
| Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 157.2017, p. 14-16
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| Subject: | Executive compensation | Principal-agent model | Prudence | Risk aversion | Risikoaversion | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Managervergütung | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.014 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011847288