Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment

We report a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase cooperation.

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Year of publication:	2011-09-26
Authors:	Noussair, Charles ; van Soest, Daan ; Stoop, Jan
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Field experiment \| public goods game \| social preferences \| punishment \| reward

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; C93 - Field Experiments ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325612