Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents
This note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple competition are robust and equilibria in mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria with simple competition provided an appropriate no-externalities assumption holds. This note provides counter examples to both these theorems when there are multiple agents.
Year of publication: |
2003-12-17
|
---|---|
Authors: | Peters, Michael |
Institutions: | Vancouver School of Economics |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms
Peters, Michael, (2010)
-
On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games
Peters, Michael, (2010)
-
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism
Celik, Gorkem, (2008)
- More ...