Putting auction theory to work : [from the pioneer of spectrum auction design for economics, business, finance]

Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Foreword -- CHAPTER ONE: Getting to Work -- 1.1 Politics Sets the Stage -- 1.2 Designing for Multiple Goals -- 1.2.1 Substitutes and Complements -- 1.2.2 New Zealand's Rights Auction -- 1.2.3 Better Auction Designs -- 1.2.4 The FCC Design and Its Progeny -- 1.3 Comparing Seller Revenues -- 1.4 The Academic Critics -- 1.4.1 Resale and the Coase Theorem -- 1.4.2 Mechanism Design Theory -- 1.4.3 Theory and Experiment -- 1.4.4 Practical Concerns -- 1.5 Plan for This Book -- REFERENCES -- PART ONE: THE MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH -- Formalities of the Mechanism Design Model -- The Chapters of Part I -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER TWO: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms -- 2.1 Formulation -- Definition -- 2.2 Always Optimal and Weakly Dominant Strategies -- 2.3 Balancing the Budget -- 2.4 Uniqueness -- 2.5 Disadvantages of the Vickrey Auction -- 2.5.1 Practical Disadvantages -- 2.5.2 Monotonicity Problems -- 2.5.3 The Merger-Investment Disadvantage -- 2.6 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER THREE: The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence -- 3.1 Hotelling's Lemma -- 3.2 The Envelope Theorem in Integral Form -- 3.3 Quasi-linear Payoffs -- 3.3.1 Holmstrom's Lemma -- 3.3.2 The Green-Laffont-Holmstrom Theorem -- 3.3.3 Myerson's Lemma -- 3.3.4 Revenue Equivalence Theorems -- 3.3.5 The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem -- 3.3.5.1 Application: Auctions Versus Lotteries -- 3.3.6 The Jehiel-Moldovanu Impossibility Theorems -- 3.3.7 Myerson and Riley-Samuelson Revenue-Maximizing Auctions -- Definitions -- 3.3.8 The McAfee-McMillan Weak-Cartels Theorem -- 3.3.9 Sequential Auctions and Weber's Martingale Theorem -- 3.3.10 Matthews' Theorem: Risk Averse Payoff Equivalence -- 3.4 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER FOUR: Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences -- 4.1 The Single Crossing Conditions.