Quality cut-offs in procurement auctions

Recently the Government of India used procurement auction mechanisms with endogenously determined minimum quality. We find these auctions have no equilibrium in continuous symmetric monotonic pure strategies. This may substantiate the use of auction mechanisms with exogenously determined minimum quality.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Goswami, Mridu Prabal
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 121.2013, 2, p. 148-151
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Procurement \| Auction \| Minimum quality

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010709110