QUALITY MEASUREMENT AND RISK-SHARING IN CONTRACTS FOR CALIFORNIA FRUITS AND VEGETABLES

We hypothesize that imperfect quality measurement in contracts for fresh fruits and vegetables results in a moral-hazard problem, and that the final price of the produce provides additional information regarding quality. As a consequence, growers are not shielded from all price risk. This hypothesis is tested informally with observations on actual contracts in California.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Hueth, Brent ; Ligon, Ethan
Institutions:	Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA
Subject:	Demand and Price Analysis \| Risk and Uncertainty

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT Number 20957
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005503205