Quality provision and governance structure variety : pooling versus double markup

Qiao Liang, George W. J. Hendrikse and Zuhui Huang

This paper examines how farmers producing differentiated quality products choose different governance structures in a non-cooperative game between farmers, enterprises, and consumers. A cooperative and an IOF (investor owned firm) coexist in equilibrium and low quality is delivered by the cooperative. The trade-off between pooling and the elimination of the double markup determines the attractiveness of cooperatives compared to IOFs. -- Quality ; Cooperatives ; Investor-Owned Firms

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Liang, Qiao ; Hendrikse, George W. J. ; Huang, Zuhui
Published in:	Institutions in transition : challenges for new models of governance; IAMO Forum 2010, 16-18 June 2010 ; 13
Publisher:	Halle (Saale) : Leibniz-Inst. für Agrarentwicklung in Mittel- und Osteuropa
Subject:	Landwirtschaft \| Agriculture \| Eigentümerstruktur \| Ownership structure \| Agrargenossenschaft \| Agricultural cooperative \| Produktqualität \| Product quality \| Produktdifferenzierung \| Product differentiation \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	Online-Ressoure: (PDF-Datei: 20 S., 168 KB) graph. Darst.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/52694 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; Q13 - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009381165