Quality Signaling of a Durable Experience Good in Presence of Informed Consumers.

A durable experience good produced by a monopoly can be of either high or low quality. While some sonsumers are informed of the quality the others are not and have to infer quality through the marketing strategy of the firm. The model is a natural extension of Bagwell and Riordan.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Linnemer, L.
Subject:	ADVERTISING \| CONSUMERS \| PRICES \| EFFICIENCY

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	22 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; M37 - Advertising
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005780813