Quantal Response Equilibrium with Non-Monotone Probabilities: A Dynamic Approach

Abstract In this paper I will give an example of a population game and of a locally improving stochastic learning process such that the quantal response equilibrium assigns to the different strategies the probabilities that are non-monotone in the payoffs. Moreover, if the initial state probabilities are payoff-monotone, then the learning can be shown the shrink mistakes in one direction and exacerbate them in the other direction.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Basov, Suren
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics
Subject:	quantal response equilibrium \| dynamic probabilistic choice models

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Department of Economics - Working Papers Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 880 13 pages
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750788