Quantity Competition in a Spatial Model.

The authors analyze a duopoly model where firms first choose locations on a line segment and then choose quantities in the second stage. Pure strategy quantity equilibria fail to exist for locations close together. For low transport costs, near agglomeration occurs and the firms choose locations where pure strategy quantity equilibria exist. As transport costs rise, firms become less direct competitors as they move away from the center of the market. Coauthors are James F. Klein, Eytan Sheshinski, and Steven M. Slutsky. We analyse a duopoly model where firms first choose locations on a line segment and then choose quantities in the second stage. Pure strategy quantity equilibria fail to exist for locations close together. For low transport costs, near agglomeration occurs and the firms choose locations where pure strategy quantity equilibria exist. As transport costs rise, firms become less direct competitors as they move away from the centre of the market. Coauthors are James F. Klein, Eytan Sheshinski, and Stephen M. Slutsky.