Quantity precommitment, Cournot outcome and asymmetric capacity costs

This note extends Kreps and Scheinkman's result -showing that a production capacity choice stage followed by price competition yields the same outcome as a Cournot game- to a setting where capacity costs are asymmetric.

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Year of publication:	2006-08-11
Authors:	Gruyer, Nicolas
Institutions:	Laboratoire d'Économie et Économétrie de l'Aérien (LEEA), École Nationale de l'Aviation Civile (ENAC)
Subject:	capacity \| Bertrand competition \| Kreps-Scheinkman \| asymmetric costs

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf; pages: 8. Number 04 8 pages
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593794