Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer’s model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer’s model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Tasnádi, Attila
Publisher:	Brussels : Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI)
Subject:	Forchheimer \| Dominant firm \| Price leadership

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Series:	EERI Research Paper Series ; 25/2009
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	866203362 [GVK] hdl:10419/142557 [Handle] RePEc:eei:rpaper:EERI_RP_2009_25 [RePEc]
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011496098