Random walks and voting theory

Voters' preferences depend on the available information. Following Case-Based Decision Theory, we assume that this information is processed additively. We prove that the collective preferences deduced from the individual ones through majority vote cannot be arbitrary, as soon as a winning quota is required. The proof is based on a new result on random walks.

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Year of publication:	2002-05-01
Authors:	VIEILLE, Nicolas
Institutions:	HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales)
Subject:	voting theory \| quotas \| random walks

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Les Cahiers de Recherche.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Les Cahiers de Recherche - Groupe HEC Number 753 20 pages
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005011524