Rational deterrence by proxy : designing cooperative security agreements
Year of publication: |
February 2017
|
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Authors: | Langlois, Catherine C. ; Langlois, Jean-Pierre P. |
Published in: |
Defence and peace economics. - Abingdon : Routledge, ISSN 1024-2694, ZDB-ID 1184671-9. - Vol. 28.2017, 1, p. 1-33
|
Subject: | Terrorism | Deterrence | Game theory | Design of international agreements | Spieltheorie | Terrorismus |
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