Rationalizability in continuous games
Define a continuous game to be one in which every player's strategy set is a Polish space, and the payoff function of each player is bounded and continuous. We prove that in this class of games the process of sequentially eliminating "never-best-reply" strategies terminates before or at the first uncountable ordinal, and this bound is tight. Also, we examine the connection between this process and common belief of rationality in the universal type space of Mertens and Zamir (1985).
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Arieli, Itai |
Published in: |
Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 46.2010, 5, p. 912-924
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Rationalizability Continuous games |
Saved in:
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