Rationalizability of one-to-one matchings with externalities

In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Saglam, Ismail ; Mumcu, Ayşe
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 4.2008, 33, p. 1-8
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	One-to-one matching Stability Externalities Rationalizability

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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