Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions.

We consider discrete versions of independent, private-value, first-price auctions. We show for any fixed finite set of possible bids, if the number of participants is large enough, then the set of rationalizable bids involves all players bidding the highest bid that is lower than their private value.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Dekel, E. ; Wolinsky, A.
Institutions:	Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Subject:	AUCTIONS \| RATIONALIZATION \| EFFICIENCY

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Series:	Tel Aviv.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	8 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783650