Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

Drew Fudenberg and Yuichiro Kamada

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.

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Year of publication:	September 2015
Authors:	Fudenberg, Drew ; Kamada, Yuichiro
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 10.2015, 3, p. 775-806
Subject:	Rationalizablity \| common knowledge \| extensive-form games \| self-confirming equilibrium \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory \| Rationalität \| Rationality \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Gleichgewichtsmodell \| Equilibrium model \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE1362 [DOI] hdl:10419/150262 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673255