Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
Drew Fudenberg, Yuichiro Kamada
| Year of publication: |
2018
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew ; Kamada, Yuichiro |
| Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 109.2018, p. 364-381
|
| Subject: | Extensive-form games | Heterogeneous beliefs | Purification | Random matching | Rationalizability | Self-confirming equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Rationalität | Rationality | Matching | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Begrenzte Rationalität | Bounded rationality | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Lernprozess | Learning process | Rationale Erwartung | Rational expectations |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.021 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012173221