Rationing as a Signal

Two consumers sequentially purchase at most one unit of some homogeneous good from a monopolist who knows the state of nature, either high or low. I characterize a rationing equilibrium at which the high-type monopolist produces only one unit and rations customers, whereas the low-type monopolist serves customers by producing two units.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Kim, Jeong-Yoo
Published in:	International Journal of Business and Economics. - College of Business, ISSN 1607-0704. - Vol. 1.2002, 2, p. 115-122
Publisher:	College of Business
Subject:	rationing \| quality \| signals \| sequential purchases

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D45 - Rationing; Licensing ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010600613