Real Earnings Management and the Properties of Analysts’ Forecasts

We examine how analysts' earnings forecast properties vary when accounting information is more difficult to process. Specifically, we investigate whether analysts' forecast properties are associated with traditional real earnings management (REM) measures. We hypothesize and find that analysts' forecast errors and dispersion are greater for REM firms. Next, we investigate cross-sectional differences among REM firms based on the presence of management guidance. We find some evidence that management guidance reduces the association between REM and analysts' forecast error, and strong evidence that management guidance reduces the association between REM and dispersion. Finally, we investigate cross-sectional differences among REM firms based on their earnings management incentives. We find that firms with low earnings management incentives drive the association between REM and analysts' forecast error and dispersion. This result suggests earnings are most difficult to forecast for REM firms lacking obvious financial reporting objectives. Our results are consistent across numerous proxies for REM. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to provide robust evidence of a relation between REM and the properties of analysts' forecasts