Reciprosity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach

Two long lived players play a repeated coordination game. Players do not specify a single (and correct) probability to each event. They have a vague notion about the evolution of the play, called blurry beliefs, which guide their behavior. General conditions that ensure cooperation are investigated. Key words: Repeated Games, Learning, Cooperation, Bounded Rationality, Equilibrium Selection.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Sandroni, Alvaro
Publisher:	Evanston, IL : Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

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Series:	Discussion Paper ; 1200
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/221556 [Handle] RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1200 [RePEc]
Classification:	D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236012