Redistribution and Crime When Agents Have Limited Liability : A Note

Monetary sanctions are less effective when agents cannot afford to pay them in full. We present a simple model of a society with two types of risk averse agents, differing in terms of productivity in the legal labor market. We consider transfers from the most productive to the least productive agents and discuss the conditions under which redistribution can reduce crime

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Year of publication:	[2008]
Authors:	Cassone, Alberto
Other Persons:	Marchese, Carla (contributor)
Publisher:	[2008]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Kriminalität \| Crime \| Theorie \| Theory \| Umverteilung \| Redistribution \| Beschränkte Haftung \| Limited liability \| Haftung \| Liability
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Review of Law & Economics, Forthcoming Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774280