Redistribution and Crime When Agents Have Limited Liability: A Note

Monetary sanctions are less effective when agents cannot afford to pay them in full. We present a simple model of a society with two types of risk averse agents, differing in terms of productivity in the legal labor market. We consider transfers from the most productive to the least productive agents, and discuss the conditions under which redistribution can reduce crime.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Cassone, Alberto ; Marchese, Carla
Published in:	Review of Law & Economics. - Berkeley Electronic Press. - Vol. 2.2007, 2, p. 2-2
Publisher:	Berkeley Electronic Press
Subject:	Crime \| Limited Liability \| Income Transfers

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	oai:bepress.com:rle-1035
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005246139