Reduced demand uncertainty and the sustainability of collusion : How AI could affect competition
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | O'Connor, Jason ; Wilson, Nathan E. |
Published in: |
Information economics and policy : IEP. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-6245, ZDB-ID 877702-0. - Vol. 54.2021, p. 1-22
|
Subject: | Artificial Intelligence | Uncertainty | Collusion | Price Discrimination | Antitrust | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Theorie | Theory | Künstliche Intelligenz | Artificial intelligence | Preisdifferenzierung | Price discrimination | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy | Risiko | Risk | Duopol | Duopoly | Preiskartell | Price-fixing cartel | Kartell | Cartel | Kartellrecht | Antitrust law | Oligopol | Oligopoly |
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