Reelection threshold contracts in politics

Hans Gersbach; Verena Liessem

When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for reelection. Read my lips would turn into read my contracts. Reelection thresholds can be offered by politicians during campaigns and do not impair the liberal principle of free and anonymous elections in democracies.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Gersbach, Hans ; Liessem, Verena
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies, Ifo-Inst.
Subject:	Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie \| Economic theory of democracy \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Wahl \| Election \| Theorie \| Theory \| Demokratie \| Kontrakttheorie \| Anreiz

Extent:	29 S.
Series:	CESifo working papers : the international platform of Ludwig-Maximilians University's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute. - Munich : CESifo, ISSN 1617-9595, ZDB-ID 2023380-2. - Vol. 622
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Literaturverz. S. 25 - 26 Internetausg.: ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/622.pdf
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Politische Beteiligung
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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