Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability

We reexamine Maskin's Theorem by proposing slight modifications on Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and no veto power. We show that any social choice correspondence (SCC) that satisfies strict monotonicity, strict no veto power and unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Doghmi, Ahmed ; Ziad, Abderrahmane
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 100.2008, 1, p. 150-152
Publisher:	Elsevier

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005361701