Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics
Year of publication: |
January 2013
|
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Authors: | Balkenborg, Dieter ; Hofbauer, Josef ; Kuzmics, Christoph |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 8.2013, 1, p. 165-192
|
Subject: | Evolutionary game theory | best response dynamics | CURB sets | persistent retracts | asymptotic stability | Nash equilibrium refinements | learning | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Lernprozess | Learning process | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE652 [DOI] hdl:10419/150188 [Handle] |
Classification: | C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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