Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any finite two-person game.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Foster, Dean P. ; Young, H. Peyton
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - New York, NY : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 1.2006, 3, p. 341-367
Publisher:	New York, NY : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Learning \| Nash equilibrium \| regret \| bounded rationality

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	895588501 [GVK] hdl:10419/150083 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:199 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599374