Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any finite two-person game.

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Year of publication:	2006-09-07
Authors:	Foster, Dean P. ; Young, H. Peyton
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 1.2006, 3, p. 341-367
Publisher:	Econometric Society
Subject:	Learning \| Nash equilibrium \| regret \| bounded rationality

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812747