Regulating executive pay : Incentive contracts and nonbinding bonus caps
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Dittrich, Marcus ; Städter, Silvio |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 177.2021, 1, p. 81-96
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Subject: | regulatory pay cap | incentive contract | moral hazard | Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Regulierung | Regulation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Anreiz | Incentives | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory |
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