Regulation and Distrust
We document that, in a cross section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with measures of trust. In a simple model explaining this correlation, distrust creates public demand for regulation, whereas regulation in turn discourages formation of trust, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low-trust countries want more government intervention even though they know the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on trust and beliefs about the role of government, as well as on changes in beliefs during the transition from socialism. (c) 2010 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology..
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Aghion, Philippe ; Algan, Yann ; Cahuc, Pierre ; Shleifer, Andrei |
Published in: |
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. - MIT Press. - Vol. 125.2010, 3, p. 1015-1049
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Publisher: |
MIT Press |
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