Relational contracts, multiple agents, and correlated outputs
Ola Kvaløy, Trond E. Olsen
| Year of publication: |
2019
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Kvaløy, Ola ; Olsen, Trond E. |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 65.2019, 11, p. 5360-5370
|
| Subject: | relational contracts | performance evaluation | incentives | teams | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Anreiz | Incentives | Arbeitsleistung | Job performance |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3162 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012125971