Relational contracts when the agent's productivity inside the relationship is correlated with outside opportunities
Year of publication: |
2011-05
|
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Authors: | Wagner, Alexander F |
Institutions: | C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers |
Subject: | Relational contracts | Repeated games |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 8378 |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; M51 - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions (hiring, firing, turnover, part-time, temporary workers, seniority issues) |
Source: |
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