Relative performance evaluation and executive compensation : evidence from Chinese listed companies

Donghua Chen, Shangkun Liang, Pin Zhu

This paper focuses on the effect of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on top managers’ compensation in Chinese public firms. Overall, we find no evidence of an RPE effect or any asymmetry in firms’ use of RPE. The results obtained using Albuquerque’s (2009) method are similar to those obtained using traditional methods. In addition, we find that RPE is used more in non-SOEs than in SOEs. This may be due to the regulation of compensation, various forms of incentives and the multiple tasks of managers in SOEs.

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Year of publication:	June 2012
Authors:	Chen, Donghua ; Liang, Shangkun ; Zhu, Pin
Subject:	Relative performance evaluation (RPE) \| Top managers' compensation \| Non-SOEs \| SOEs \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation \| China \| Vergütungssystem \| Compensation system \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Aktiengesellschaft \| Listed company \| Performance-Messung \| Performance measurement

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1016/j.cjar.2012.02.002 [DOI] hdl:10419/187568 [Handle]
Classification:	G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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